Comparing Religious Intolerance in Indonesia by Affiliation to Muslim Organizations

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Abstract

Very few studies explicitly, let alone quantitatively, examine gaps in religious intolerance among individual Muslims based on affiliation with major Muslim organizations in Indonesia. Most existing studies either focus on a single organization (non-comparative), are at the organizational policy level (not examining individual attitudes), or use a limited number of samples in their analysis. Against this backdrop, this study compares Indonesian Muslims' levels of religious intolerance based on their affiliation with Muslim organizations or traditions: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and other organizations. We utilize a large-scale household survey, the 2014 Indonesia Family Life Survey-5, and run an ordinal logistic regression to identify organizations' rank on the religious intolerance scale. We find that Muslims without any affiliation with a Muslim organization (some 18 percent of Indonesian Muslims) are the most tolerant. Against this reference group, we find that NU followers are generally the most tolerant, followed by those affiliated with Muhammadiyah, and those affiliated with other Muslim organizations. This finding adds a stock of knowledge to our understanding of religion and society, especially regarding interfaith relations in Indonesia and in the Muslim world in general. Methodologically, this study also shows the benefit and feasibility of identifying the dynamic of religious intolerance using a quantitative approach at a micro level.

Keywords: religious intolerance, Islam, Indonesia, interfaith relations, religious organization, quantitative analysis, microdata

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Introduction

This article is part of a larger research agenda aimed at understanding the dynamic of religious intolerance in various parts of the world. We focus on Indonesia for three reasons. First, until recently, the country has been considered a role model for religious tolerance, in comparison to other Muslim majority countries.[1] Second, Indonesia is an example of how a relatively secular state previously ruled by an authoritarian regime (in this case, Suharto from 1967 to 1998) has successfully transitioned to a democracy despite challenges posed by interreligious conflicts and the inaction of the government in enforcing the law against intolerant groups, highlighting the important role of non-state actors in promoting religious tolerance.[2] Third, the last twenty years has witnessed a tendency towards a "conservative turn" and increased religious intolerance in Indonesia.[3]

Against this backdrop of the country's ongoing democratic consolidation and battle against religious intolerance, we focus on the role of religious organizations in determining the level of individual religious intolerance among Muslim Indonesians. Our study draws on the work of, among others, Gay and Ellison,[4] who find that in the United States, denominational affiliations have always been an important source of variation among religious followers in their everyday practice of tolerance.

In Indonesia, no serious discussion on religious affiliations can be held without acknowledging the roles of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the country's two largest Islamic organizations.[5] NU,

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[1] Jeremy Menchik and Katrina Trost, "A 'Tolerant' Indonesia? Indonesian Muslims in Comparative Perspective," in *Routledge Handbook Of Contemporary Indonesia*, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 391.

[2] Franz Magnis-Suseno, "Christian and Muslim Minorities in Indonesia," in *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*, eds. Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 220.

[3] Martin van Bruinessen, "Introduction: Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam and the 'Conservative Turn' on The Early Twenty-First Century," in *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn,"* ed. Martin van Bruinessen (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013), 1.

[4] David Gay and Christopher Ellison, "Religious Subcultures and Political Tolerance: Do Denominations Still Matter?" *Review of Religious Research* 34, no. 4 (1993): 311–332.

[5] Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance Without Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 5.

arguably the world's largest Islamic organization,[6] is frequently portrayed as the protector of democracy and a champion for Islamic moderation and religious tolerance in Indonesia.[7] However, not everybody agrees. A number of articles in the last five years[8] have already seriously challenged the notion of Indonesian Islam, including NU, being exceptionally tolerant.

Mietzner and Muhtadi's 2020 article is a good case in point.[9] It squarely challenges the notion of NU followers being pluralist and argues that the politically pragmatic NU does not live up to its image as a genuinely religiously tolerant organization. This line of argument is actually not entirely new, as previous scholars such as Bush[10] and Fealy[11] have also labelled NU as a political organization, pursuing their own agenda and material interests. More recent literature has also highlighted NU's problematic position on religious tolerance.[12]

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[6] Andrée Feillard, "Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia," in *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*, eds. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford University Press), 558.

[7] Greg Barton, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid* (Jakarta-Singapore: Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2002), 10; Martin van Bruinessen, "Liberal and Progressive Voices in Indonesian Islam," in *Reformist Voices of Islam Mediating Islam and Modernity*, ed. Shirren T. Hunter (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 209; Mirjam Künkler and Julia Leininger, "The Multi-faceted Role of Religious Actors in Democratization Processes: Empirical Evidence from Five Young Democracies," *Democratization* 16, no. 6 (2009): 1058–1092; Robert W. Hefner, "Profiles in Pluralism: Religion and Politics in Indonesia," in *Religion on The News International Agenda*, ed. Mark Silk (Hartford, CO: The Leonard E. Greenberg Center, 2000), 82; Robin Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), 3R.

[8] Alexander Arifianto, "Rising Islamism and the Struggle for Islamic Authority in Post-Reformasi Indonesia," *Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia* 8, no. 1(2019): 37–50; "The State of Political Islam in Indonesia: The Historical Antecedent and Future Prospects," *Asia Policy* 15, no. 4 (2020): 111–132; "Nahdlatul Ulama and Its Commitment Towards Moderate Political Norms: A Comparison Between the Abdurrahman Wahid and Jokowi Era," *Journal of Global Strategic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2021): 77–114; Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation," *Asian Studies Review* 42, no. 3 (2018): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2018.1473335; "The Myth of Pluralism: Nahdlatul Ulama and The Politics of Religious Tolerance in Indonesia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 42, no. 1 (2020): 58–84, https://doi: 10.1355/cs42-1c; Marcus Mietzner, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Riza Halida, "Entrepreneurs of Grievance Drivers and Effects of Indonesia's Islamist Mobilization," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia and Oceania* 174, nos. 2–3 (2018): 159–187; Saskia Schäfer, "Democratic Decline in Indonesia: The Role of Religious Authorities," *Pacific Affairs* 92, no. 2 (2019): 235–255.

[9] Mietzner and Muhtadi, "The Myth of Pluralism: Nahdlatul Ulama and the Politics of Religious Tolerance in Indonesia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 42, no. 1 (2020): 58–84.

[10] Robin Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), 3.

[11] Greg Fealy, "Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952–1967," (PhD thesis, Monash University, 1998).

[12] Alexander Arifianto, "Islam Nusantara & Its Critics: The Rise of NU's Young Clerics," RSIS Commentary, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, no. 18, 23 January 2017, accessed 10 May 2021, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/CO17018.pdf ; Ken Miichi and Yuke Kayane, "The Politics of Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: The Shi'a Response to the Sampang Incidents of 2011–12," *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia* 8, no. 1 (2019): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.12; Yuke Kayane, "Understanding Sunni-Shi'a Sectarianism in Contemporary Indonesia," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 48, issue 140 (2020): 78–96; Schäfer, "Democratic Decline," 254.

Typically, these contributions to the mainstream literature share the characteristics of presenting a qualitative study, using organizational policies or elite factions as the unit of observation, and providing a non-comparative discussion of the dynamic within the organization. Moreover, these studies tend to exploit recent political incidents or conflicts—notably Shi'a and Ahmadiyya conflicts, the internal politics of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesia Council of Islamic Clerics), or political rallies against non-Muslim candidates for the Jakarta governorship—as the empirical strategy to identify the level of intolerance within each organization.

In this article, we take a different direction and aim to quantitatively describe Indonesian Muslims' degrees of religious intolerance by their proximity to religious organizations: NU, Muhammadiyah, and non-NU and Muhammadiyah. We share a similar methodological approach with Mietzner and Muhtadi,[13] Menchik,[14] and Menchik and Trost[15] in using quantitative survey and statistical estimation strategies to identify religious intolerance by religious affiliations at the individual level, rather than at the policy level or among an organization's elite.

Specifically, we estimate Muslims' religious intolerance by organizational affiliations by running an ordinal logistic regression on the 2014 Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) dataset, controlling for individual socioeconomic status and location.[16] The 2014 IFLS dataset has a much larger number of representative respondents and detailed information on household characteristics than the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, LSI) dataset used by Mietzner and Muhtadi. It also has more specific information on individual religious affiliation than the Menchik and Trost dataset and the respondents are not limited to the elites of the organizations, as in the Menchik study.[17]

We establish that in most cases, NU followers fared better on religious tolerance metrics than Muslims affiliated with Muhammadiyah and other Muslim organizations in Indonesia. Our major contribution to the literature on Islamic organizations and religious intolerance in Indonesia lies in our use of an extensive quantitative approach to estimate individual-level religious intolerance differences based on organizational affiliation.

Beyond its methodological contribution, our article adds to the discussion on diversity within Islam, especially on Muslims' views on religious intolerance. It is also well situated to discuss the relationship between Islam and democracy, including the problem of illiberal democratization, which occurs when religions organizations support democracy and religious tolerance as

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[13] Mietzner and Muhtadi, "The Myth."

[14] Jeremy Menchik, "Islam and Democracy."

[15] Menchik and Trost, "A Tolerant Indonesia."

[16] Soemaktoyo, "Measuring religious intolerance," also warned to not overlook the importance of subnational variation.

[17] Menchik, "Islam And Democracy."

an opportunistic means of maintaining political power or to procure protection from the state.

On Religious Intolerance in Indonesia and the Roles of NU and Muhammadiyah

In recent years, Indonesia has experienced a combination of increasingly hardline Islamic social and political power in democracy and a turn to populist conservatism in major Muslim organizations. Along the way, this development has adversely transformed Indonesian Muslims' attitudes on Islam and relationships with non-Muslims as documented in many media reports on Muslim rejections of different faith practices, various surveys on religious intolerance, and cross-provincial correlations between religious intolerance and votes for the more Islamist conservative 2019 presidential candidate.[18] In this context, we highlight the dynamic features of Indonesia's two largest Muslim organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, on religious tolerance.

In general, there are two contending perspectives on NU's commitment to pluralism and religious tolerance. First, proponents argue that pluralism has been a critical discourse for NU since at least the mid-1980s, with the rise of Abdurrahman Wahid as its executive chairman (1984–1999) and president of Indonesia (1999–2001). In recent years, the traditional clerics, *kyais*, in NU are known to play an important role in introducing inclusive Islam values, closely embedded in the traditions of the local community. Indeed, the most influential *kyai* in this campaign is none other than Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur), a champion of an inclusive Islam that embraces pluralism and upholds tolerance on various aspects of social relations in Indonesia.[19]

NU's *kyais*' teaching of inclusiveness alongside the local traditions is at odds with a more radical and narrower interpretation of Islam.[20] As a result, NU and affiliated organizations often find themselves on the opposite sides of an issue with more conservative, often radical, Muslim organizations. Organizationally, NU has a significant capacity to disseminate its views on the state, religion, and democracy to their supporters and to the broader,

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[18] For a more detailed overview on rising conservatism and religious intolerance in Indonesia, see Arief A. Yusuf, Akhmad R. Shidiq, and Hariyadi, "On Socioeconomic Predictors of Religious Intolerance: Evidence from a Large-Scale Longitudinal Survey in the Largest Muslim Democracy," *Religions* 11, no. 1 (2020):21, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11010021.

[19] Greg Barton, "The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurrahman Wahid's Thought," in *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia* (Clayton, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1996); Yenny Zannuba Wahid, ed., *Ragam Ekspresi Islam Nusantara* [The Variety of expression of archipelago Islam] (Jakarta: the Wahid Institute, 2008).

[20] Rubaidi, *Radikalisme Islam, Nahdlatul Ulama: Masa Depan Moderatisme Islam di Indonesia* [Islamic radicalism, Nahdlatul Ulama: the future of Islamic moderatism] (Yogyakarta: Logung Pustaka, 2010), 65.

Indonesian community.[21] Historically, NU religious traditions have also long been considered an effective tool for mobilizing members of society from any background, communicating social messages (especially in a rural setting), and mobilizing communal movements in times of crisis and beyond.[22]

The latest NU stated commitment to pluralism and religious tolerance was the declaration of the doctrine of *Islam Nusantara* during its 33rd Congress in 2015.[23] NU avers that "*Islam Nusantara* is an Islam that is tolerant, peaceful, and accommodative to local culture."[24] This ideology promotes Islam with Indonesian characters and strongly rejects radical and fanatical expressions of Islam.[25] In many ways, *Islam Nusantara* is an extension or reinforcement of the earlier NU standpoint inspired by Abdurrahman Wahid's idea of *Pribumisasi Islam* (Islamic indigenization) and rejection of *Arabisasi* (Islamic Arabization) in Indonesia.[26]

The notion of plurality is also essential to the beliefs of Muhammadiyah elites—the second-largest Muslim organization in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah believes in pluralism in the ordinances of worship and social relations and the organization plays a crucial role in encouraging Indonesian Muslims to accept pluralism as beneficial and good.[27] In fact, during their 44th National Congress in Makassar in 2015, Muhammadiyah also explicitly declared its intention to promote the moderation of Islam, avoid labelling another Muslim an apostate (*murtad*), and foster religious tolerance.[28]

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[21] Ahmad Baso, *"Agama NU" Untuk NKRI* [Religion of NU for the Republic of Indonesia] (Jakarta: Pustaka Afid, 2013); Anton Lucas, "The Tiga Daerah Affair," in *Regional Dynamics of The Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity*, ed. Audrey K. Kahin (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1989); Harry A. Poeze, *Tan Malaka, Gerakan Kiri dan Revolusi Indonesia (Jilid 1: Agustus 1945-Maret 1946)* [Tan Malaka, left movement and Indonesian revolution, chapter 1: August 1945–March 1946] (Jakarta: KITLV Jakarta & Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2008); Sutiyono, Benturan *Budaya Islam: Puritan dan Sinkretis* [Cultural clash of Islam: p`uritan and syncretic] (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010).

[22] Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960); Else Ensering, "Banten in Times of Revolution," *Archipel* 50 (1995): 31–163, https://www.persee.fr/doc/arch_0044-8613_1995_num_50_1_3068; Nancy K. Florida, *Writing the Past, Inscribing the Future: History as Prophecy in Colonial Java* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1995).

[23] The conceptual foundation is summed up in a compendium of takes by Indonesian Islamic thinkers—mostly from NU traditions—by Akhmad Sahal and Muhammad Aziz, eds., *Islam Nusantara: Dari Ushûl Fiqh Hingga Konsep Historis* [Archipelago Islam: from Islamic law to historical concept] (Bandung: Mizan, 2015).

[24] Akhmad Sahal, "Prolog: Kenapa Islam Nusantara" [Prologue: Why Archipelago Islam] in *Islam Nusantara: Dari Ushûl Fiqh Hingga Konsep Historis* [Archipelago Islam: From Islamic law to historical concept], eds. Ahmad Sahal and Muhammad Aziz (Bandung: Mizan, 2015), 1–15.

[25] Nico J. G. Kaptein, "The Arab Middle East and Religious Authority in Indonesia," *Tebuireng: Journal of Islamic Studies and Society* 1, no. 1 (2020): 1–16.

[26] Abdurrahman Wahid, "Pribumisasi Islam" [Indigenization of Islam] in *Islam Indonesia Menatap Masa Depan* [Indonesian Islam facing the future], ed. Azhari Abdul Mun'im Saleh (Jakarta: P3M), 15–25.

[27] Greg Barton, "The Gülen Movement, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama: Progressive Islamic Thought, Religious Philanthropy and Civil Society in Turkey and Indonesia," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 25, no. 3 (2014): 278–301, https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2014.916124.

[28] Hilman Latief and Haedar Nashir, "Local Dynamics and Global Engagements of the Islamic Modernist Movement in Contemporary Indonesia: The Case of Muhammadiyah (2000-2020)," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 39, no. 2 (2020): 290–309.

To a certain degree, despite their ideological and institutional differences, in their official rulings as Muslim organizations, both NU and Muhammadiyah embrace pluralism. In relatively more personal issues, such as greeting Christians and sending Muslims to non-Muslim schools, there seems to be no significant doctrinal differences between NU and Muhammadiyah.[29] Further, Künkler and Stepan point out that both NU and Muhammadiyah have taken strong stances against the idea of Indonesia as an Islamic state and sharia law enforcement.[30]

Nevertheless, despite what many observers accept about religious tolerance by the major Muslim organizations in Indonesia, Menchik[31] argues that NU is the most tolerant organization relative to Muhammadiyah and the Persis (Persatuan Islam, Islamic Union). According to Menchik, this is due to NU's historical alliance with Christians against modernist Muslims during its formative years, its closeness to the state, and its strong Javanese roots. Muhammadiyah is second as its tolerance stance stems from different factors: the late split with Christians in Central Java and more limited ties to the state. It is worth noting that Menchik[32] classifies both organizations' definition of religious tolerance as a communal tolerance instead of individual rights-based liberalism.

Mietzner and Muhtadi[33] disagree with this rather sympathetic and favourable view on NU tolerance. They posit that although NU elites' involvement in the 2019 general election campaign effectively reduced the electoral votes for Islamist hardliners, the NU leadership did not manage to discourage intolerant attitudes toward religious minority groups among their members. To them, NU's strong opposition to hardline Islamic groups should be better understood as a political strategy against other religion-based, more conservative Islamic groups that threaten NU's political dominance, rather than a moral movement to defend pluralism.

Closer to our article, based on their quantitative survey, Mietzner and Muhtadi find that, in the midst of rising religious intolerance, the attitudes of NU followers on religious tolerance are not significantly different from those of Muhammadiyah, other affiliations, and no affiliation followers. Specifically, they assert that the percentage of NU followers who object to non-Muslim events and worship premises in their neighbourhood and the appointment of non-Muslim governors is as high as among members of other

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[29] Muhammad Ali, "Between Faith and Social Relations: The Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama's Fatwas and Ideas on Non-Muslims and Interreligious Relations," *The Muslim World* 110, no. 4 (2020): 458–480.

[30] Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan, "Indonesian Democratization in Theoretical Perspective," in *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*, eds. Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 193–223.

[31] Menchik, "Islam and Democracy," 138.

[32] Menchik, "Islam and Democracy," 155–156.

[33] Mietzner and Muhtadi, "The Myth."

Islam affiliations and even slightly higher than Muhammadiyah supporters. Furthermore, the percentage of NU members who share anti-Chinese sentiments was no lower than in the rest of the Muslim population.

Arifianto also points out that there is a disjoint between NU elites' public campaigns for democracy and tolerance and NU followers and local leaders' involvement in the persecution of minorities, such as members of Ahmadiyya and Shia, stemming from its decentralized organizational structure, where local clerics retain substantial theological authority.[34] In their documentation on a series of anti-Shi'a sectarian incidents provoked by NU clerics in East Java, Miichi and Kayane[35] support this assertion: non-mainstream intolerance practices are born out of, ironically, the embrace of diversity within NU.[36] Aside from elite fragmentation, Menchik attributes the exclusion of Ahmadiyya and Shia to the practice of communal tolerance by Indonesian Islamic organizations; this kind of tolerance is not something we can readily find in Western theories of political liberalism.[37]

NU's flagship idea of a tolerant *Islam Nusantara* has faced criticism from within NU itself. For example, the NU *Garis Lurus* (the straight or "righteous" path), a faction within NU, has adopted a less inclusive interpretation of traditional Sunni Islamic teachings by rejecting the notion of localized or Indonesian Islam, and avers that there is only one (universal) Islam.[38] To this, Arifianto[39] argues that the political leverage of this NU faction should not be ignored due to its close alliance with more conservative and hardliner groups like the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) and Indonesia Mujahidin Council (MMI). This alliance had a strong and prominent presence in large "Defending Islam" rallies on December 4 and 12, 2016, which succeeded in their political goal of sending Jakarta's then governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) to jail for allegedly committing a blasphemous act—an incident that marked the declining authoritative influence of both mainstream NU and Muhammadiyah on Indonesian Muslims.[40] After Siradj defeated Muzadi in the 2015 chairmanship election it was found that the critical responses towards Islam Nusantara were a result of contestation between factions associated with two former NU chairmen—the late Hasyim Muzadi and Said Aqil Siradj.[41]

NU also has a significant presence on the board of the increasingly more conservative Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesia Council of Islamic

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34 Arifianto, "Islam Nusantara."
35 Miichi and Kayane, "The Politics."
36 Kayane, "Understanding Sunni-Shi'a."
37 Menchik, "Islam and Democracy," 65.
38 Ahmad Najib Burhani, *Islam Nusantara [Archipelago Islam] as A Promising Response to Religious Intolerance and Radicalism* (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018).
39 Arifianto, "Islam Nusantara."
40 Arifianto, "Nahdlatul Ulama," 101.
41 Arifianto, "Islam Nusantara."

Clerics), whose anti-pluralist stance[42] contributed to Indonesia's recent democratic stagnation. Ma'ruf Amin, Indonesia's vice president and one of the top NU elites, is a prime example of this line of argument. Amin was the Rais Aam of NU, the leader of its supreme governing council (2015–2018) and chairman of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (2015–2020). Throughout his tenure at MUI, Amin's record on pluralism (anti-LGBT rights) and religious tolerance (anti-Ahmadiyah and, most importantly, anti-Ahok) has been very problematic.[43]

Methodological Framework

Analytical Framework and Econometric Specification

We ask a simple question: Do we know the religious intolerance gap among the followers of Muslim groups? Conceptually, belonging to a certain religious organization or denomination may or may not affect the level of religious intolerance. Gay and Ellison[44] identify that the differences in the level of political tolerance—willingness to extend civil liberties to the deviants, including people of a different faith or religious denomination—of the followers can be driven by the differences in the organization's theological orientation on interfaith tolerance or, more mechanically, the difference in the organization's institutional pressures for behavioural conformity among its followers. In the United States, they found significant differences in the level of political tolerance among the major religious denominations in the 1980s, even after controlling for differences in socio-economic status, or the secular modernization effects.

Another conceptual link between religious group membership and intolerance is by way of religious communal practices: religious organizations accommodate communal prayer and the prayers decrease religious tolerance due to the effect of enforcing religious group boundaries and in-group identity. In line with this argument, Hoffman,[45] in a study on Lebanon in 2013 and 2014, found that communal religious practices increased religious intolerance, although personal prayer, by enforcing self-control, did the opposite.

Our motivation is more practical. In this case, we share Mietzner and

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[42] Schäfer, "Democratic Decline," 254.

[43] Greg Fealy, "Ma'ruf Amin: Jokowi's Islamic defender or deadweight" (New Mandala, 28 August 2018), accessed 1 June 2021, https://www.newmandala.org/maruf-amin-jokowis-islamic-defender-deadweight/; Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia: Vice Presidential Candidate Has Anti-Rights Record," accessed 25 May 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/10/indonesia-vice-presidential-candidate-has-anti-rights-record.

[44] Gay and Ellison, "Religious Subcultures," 311–332.

[45] Michael Hoffman, "Religion and Tolerance of Minority Sects in the Arab World," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64, nos. 2–3 (2020): 432–458, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719864404.

Muhtadi's[46] concern that what is being (organizationally) preached may not necessarily be what is believed and practiced. In other words, the changes or differences in the perspectives on religious intolerance identified at the level of the organizations' elite or the stated policies may not reflect the followers' position and attitude. Our objective is to identify the differences in religious intolerance at Muslim organizations' individual member level.

Employing a broad definition, "tolerance requires us to accept people and permit their practice even when we strongly disapprove of them."[47] Our article puts aside the philosophical conundrums around this concept (Habermas's[48] total inclusion principle or Scanlon's[49] difficulty of tolerance) and is more pragmatist in measuring religious intolerance by using available indicators. Without any intention to establish causality, we estimated the correlation between being a certain Muslim organization's follower and each individual's religious intolerance level using the following specification:[50]

$$y_i^* = X'_i\beta + u_i, \qquad (1)$$

where y_{ij} is an unobserved latent continuous variable of the i^{th} individual's level of intolerance; X'_i is the observed religious affiliation and socioeconomic characteristics of an individual i; β is the K × 1 vector of parametres to be estimated; and u_{ijt} are idiosyncratic unobservable factors (i.e., the error term).

We observed that for m-alternative ordered model of religious intolerance level,

$$y_i = j \quad \text{if } \alpha_{j-1} < y_i^* \leq \alpha_j, \quad j=1, \ldots, m \qquad (2)$$

where $\alpha_0 = -\infty$ and $\alpha_m = \infty$.

Then:

$$\Pr(y_i = j) = \Pr(\alpha_{j-1} < y_i^* \leq \alpha_j) = F(\alpha j - x'_i\beta) - F(\alpha_{j-1} - x'_i\beta) \qquad (3)$$

where F is a logistic cumulative distribution function, $F(z) = e^z / (1 + e^z)$, making the model an ordered logit model, and the regression parametres,

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[46] Mietzner and Muhtadi, "The Myth," 65.

[47] Thomas Michael Scanlon, *The Difficulty of Tolerance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 187.

[48] Jürgen Habermas, "Religious Tolerance—The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights," *Philosophy* 79, issue 0 (2004), 5–18, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819104000026.

[49] Scanlon, "The Difficulty," 194.

[50] Adrian Colin Cameron and Kevin P. Trivedi, *Microeconometrics Using Stata*, revised ed. (College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2010).

β, is generated by maximizing the log likelihood with $p_{ij} = \Pr(y_i = j)$ defined in equation 3.

From the specification above, we also estimate the marginal effects of an increase in x_r, the religious affiliation, on the probability selecting alternative j, the level of intolerance, as follows:

$$\partial p_{ij} / \partial x_{ri} = \{F'(\alpha_{j-1} - x'_i) - F'(\alpha_j - x'_i)\}\, \beta_r . \qquad (4)$$

This average marginal effect, , of the different organization affiliation, and the odds-ratio converted from the coefficients of parametre , for the Muslim organization affiliation variable are our main identifications to estimate the difference in religious intolerance levels by Muslim organizations.

Data and Variables

We use the 2014 Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS-5), a longitudinal socioeconomic and health survey representing approximately 83 percent of the Indonesian population, covering over 30,000 individuals living in 13 of 34 provinces.[51] We complement the IFLS-5 with more location-specific information constructed from the National Socio-Economic Surveys (SUSENAS) 2014. We only include Muslim individuals in our analysis, dropping the non-Muslims (around 10 percent of respondents), since we focus on the willingness of the majority (the Muslims) to tolerate the religious minorities in Indonesia.

While the IFLS-5 is not specifically designed to study religious intolerance by Muslim organizations and its limited number of specific questions on religious intolerance may prevent a comprehensive exploration on the subject, the survey still provides a strong basis for analysis for the following reasons. First, by reducing the problem of selection bias, this large-N IFLS survey provides a significant statistical advantage in terms of representativeness over case studies or surveys with a smaller number of respondents.[52] Second, this survey has comprehensive information on individual socioeconomic factors that may also affect intolerance levels, minimizing the problem of confounding variables bias.

For the dependent variable, we derive our measure for the level of individual religious intolerance from the following five specific questions from IFLS-5[53]: How would you feel if someone with a different faith from

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[51] John Strauss, Firman Witoelar, and Bondan Sikoki, "The Fifth Wave of The Indonesia Family Life Survey: Overview and Field Report: Volume 1" (Working Paper, RAND Corporation), accessed 27 May 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR1143z1.html.

[52] Mietzner and Muhtadi, "The Myth," 61; and Menchik, "Islam and Democracy," 28.

[53] Previous studies have used questions similar to the ones found in the IFLS as proxies for religious tolerance or social cooperation. See Yusuf, Shidiq, and Hariyadi, "On Socioeconomic," 9, and Arya Gaduh, "Uniter or Divider? Religion and Social Cooperation: Evidence from Indonesia," (SSRN, 14 October 2012), accessed 20 May 2022, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1991484.

you: (1) Lives in your village? (2) Lives in your neighbourhood? (3) Rents a room from you? (4) Marries one of your close relatives or children? And (5) builds a house of worship in your community? For each question, respondents choose any of the following options: (1) no objection at all; (2) no objection; (3) object; or (4) strongly object.[54] In other words, in equation 2, $m = 4$.

We use IFLS-5's specific question on respondents' proximity to one of the Islamic organizations as our main independent variable. We categorize the individual's Islamic organization affiliation based on the IFLS-5 question on which Islamic tradition the respondent feels closest to: NU, Muhammadiyah, affiliations other than the first two, and not affiliated with any Islamic tradition. We assume that the proximity or closeness to a particular tradition with followership of the respective Muslim organization because the organizational membership of religious organizations in Indonesia is mostly informal. There are no strict and formal procedures to be a member of these organizations as well as modern membership administration from the organizations' side. Yet, since the self-declared membership or followership to Muslim organizations is generally well defined and consistent, we do not foresee any significant measurement errors in this assumption. This relatively well-defined idea of being closer to NU or Muhammadiyah traditions in Indonesia also minimizes another potential measurement error wherein respondents are misclassified into the "other – non-NU and Muhammadiyah" group.[55]

Besides organizational affiliation, we use a series of socioeconomic predictors of religious intolerance in Indonesia, namely income and job security status, educational attainment, individual religiosity, community characteristics (urbanization, poverty, and inequality), and demographic characteristics (age and marital status) as our regression controls. The theoretical justification for using these predictors is summarized in Mulder and Krahn and Stolz.[57] We also control for location-specific or regional effects.[58] Nonetheless, since we use controls for socioeconomic and location factors mostly as a strategy to minimize omitted-variable bias problems in

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[54] We relabel the options from the original IFLS code of 1) strongly objecting; (2) objecting; (3) no objection; or (4) no objection at all.

[55] This type of problem is discussed in Darren Sherkat, "Tracking the 'Other': Dynamics and Composition of 'Other' Religions in the General Social Survey," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 38, no. 4 (1999): 551–560.

[57] Marlene Mulder and Harvey Krahn, "Individual- and Community-Level Determinants of Support for Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Canada," *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne de Sociologie* 42 (2005): 421–444, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-618X.2005.tb00848.x; Jorg Stolz, "Explaining Islamophobia. A Test of Four Theories Based on the Case of a Swiss City," *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 31 (2006): 547–566.

[58] The importance is highlighted by Nathanael Soemaktoyo, "Measuring Religious Intolerance across Indonesian Provinces," *New Mandala*, 1 June 2018, accessed 24 February 2021, https://www.newmandala.org/measuring-religious-intolerance-across-indonesian-provinces/.

our regression analysis, we do not exhaustively discuss their effects on religious intolerance in our empirical findings section.

Empirical Findings

Descriptive Statistics

We start by providing basic descriptive statistics of Indonesian Muslims by organization affiliations. These statistics lead us to the observations detailed below.

First, scholars of Islam in Indonesia believe that the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims identify more closely with NU traditions. To be precise, the IFLS-5 shows that, in 2014, 66 percent of Indonesian Muslims consider themselves closest to NU traditions (figure 1). Muhammadiyah tradition, the second-largest mainstream Muslim organization, is practiced by 12 percent of Indonesian Muslims. Interestingly, a significant share of Muslims, 18 percent, claim to be unaffiliated to any Islamic tradition, which is six percentage points larger than Muhammadiyah adherents. On the other hand, 4 percent of Indonesian Muslims declare themselves closest to other Islamic traditions, which are neither NU nor Muhammadiyah.

Figure 1
Share of Muslims by proximity to Islamic tradition (percentage)



Source: IFLS-5, authors' calculation.

Second, affiliation concentration varies significantly across provinces. We measure the concentration by comparing the number of Muslims affiliated to a particular organization in a province to the total number of Muslims affiliated to that organization nationally, and the number of Muslims living in that province to the total number of all Muslims in Indonesia. By that measure, among provinces surveyed by IFLS-5, NU supporters are highly concentrated in East Java. The percentage of NU followers in East Java (17.1

percent of total NU followers) is 2.9 percentage points higher than the percentage of Muslims in East Java (14.3 percent of total Indonesian Muslims). Muhammadiyah followers are concentrated in West Sumatra and Yogyakarta, where the differences are staggeringly 9.3 and 15.7 percentage points higher than Indonesian Muslims' share in these two provinces.

Table 1
Affiliation concentration by provinces

		The difference in the share of Muslims in the province (affiliated Muslims' share compared to all Muslims' share)			
	All Muslims	**Not affiliated**	**NU**	**Muhammadiyah**	**Other**
North Sumatra	5.35	-1.94	0.5	0.52	-1.09
West Sumatra	5.14	1.86	-2.06	9.28	-1.77
South Sumatra	5.26	5	-1.16	-0.2	-3.13
Lampung	4.65	-2.42	1.06	-1.61	-1.63
Jakarta	6.67	2.39	0.16	-3.04	-4.54
West Java	14.96	4.03	-0.79	-6.77	14.76
Central Java	13.62	1.47	1.47	-1.35	-0.67
Yogyakarta	5.32	-1.48	-2.18	15.68	-3.63
East Java	14.25	-2.92	2.88	-8.02	-10.7
Bali	0.73	-0.4	0.15	-0.13	-0.2
West Nusa Tenggara	8.32	1.44	-1.71	-0.25	22.56
South Kalimantan	4.98	-2.58	1.37	-2.45	-3.92
South Sulawesi	4.55	0.18	-0.25	1.79	-1.98
Other provinces	6.21	1.16	0.55	-3.47	-4.08
Total	100				

Source: IFLS-5, authors' calculation.

Third, by province, as shown in figure 2, NU followers constitute the majority in all provinces, except Yogyakarta. NU followers are most dominant in South Kalimantan and Lampung (84 and 81 percent of the total number of Muslims) and East and Central Java, Bali, and North Sumatra. NU's dominance in Java is more profound since it is the most populous island. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah's strongholds are in Yogyakarta (47 percent of the Muslims in the province) and West Sumatra (33 percent), which also happen to be two provinces with the lowest proportion of NU followers. It might not be a coincidence that Muhammadiyah was first established in Yogyakarta.

Figure 2

Share of Muslim affiliation by province



Source: IFLS-5, authors' calculation.

Fourth, quite a significant fraction of Indonesian Muslims do not meet the criteria for being religiously tolerant. Within the range of religious tolerance indicators (1 for no objections at all, to 4 for strong objections), the mean value ranged from 2.3 to 3.3. It also appears that more personal types of interaction are associated with a lower level of interfaith-interaction acceptance. To illustrate, the mean value of the level of objection for having non-Muslims living in the same village is 2.3, but goes up to 3.3 on the issue of interfaith marriage in the family (figure 3).

Figure 3
The level of objection based on religious tolerance indicators (all Muslims)



Source: IFLS-5, author calculation.

Note: The range of value for the level of objection is 1 (no objection at all), 2 (no objection), 3 (objection), 3 (strong objection).

Fifth, across affiliations, based on the simple mean values of intolerance indicators, NU followers are just slightly more tolerant than Muhammadiyah followers and significantly more tolerant than other organization groups. Table 2 shows that the differences in objection rates between NU and Muhammadiyah followers are small—between 2.3 and 3.4 percentage points in indicators. By this indicator, NU followers are significantly more tolerant than those belonging to non-NU and Muhammadiyah organizations, with gaps of around 7.6 to 10 percentage points.

Yet, the assertion that NU followers' tolerance levels are different from those of other Indonesian Muslims is complicated. The difference in simple mean values of the objection rates in table 1 fails to consider differences in other factors, at the individual or location level, that may also affect an individual's religious tolerance. For example, table 1 also shows that NU followers tend to have lower income and educational attainments and are more likely to live in rural areas. To control for and consider these other confounding socioeconomic factors, we conduct a regression analysis and interpret the results in the next section.

Before running the regression, it is worth addressing the Muslims not affiliated to any Muslim organization (18.2 percent of total Muslims), i.e., the reference group, and those affiliated to neither NU nor Muhammadiyah (4 percent). Out of these percentages, the reference, not-affiliated Muslims are concentrated in West Java and Jakarta (table 1), constitute the richest group in term of per capita expenditure, and are generally more educated

Table 2
Mean of objection level and differences by affiliations

	Mean (SD)				Differences		
	Not affiliated	**NU**	**Muhammadiyah**	**Other**	**NU vs. no affiliation**	**NU vs. Muhammadiyah**	**NU vs. other**
Objection level							
Live in the same village	2.219 (0.595)	2.257 (0.630)	2.273 (0.665)	2.360 (0.694)	0.037***	-0.017	-0.103***
Live in the same neighbourhood	2.229 (0.584)	2.267 (0.620)	2.290 (0.642)	2.375 (0.684)	0.038***	-0.023**	-0.108***
Rent a room from you	2.576 (0.705)	2.620 (0.719)	2.638 (0.744)	2.697 (0.724)	0.043***	-0.018	-0.076***
Marry your relative	3.193 (0.727)	3.256 (0.699)	3.272 (0.707)	3.347 (0.659)	0.063***	-0.016	-0.091***
Build a place of worship in your community	2.736 (0.762)	2.821 (0.772)	2.856 (0.791)	2.926 (0.770)	0.086***	-0.034**	-0.105***
Socioeconomic level							
Per capita expenditure (in logarithm)	1.192 (1.164)	1.051 (0.900)	1.157 (0.983)	1.038 (0.995)	-0.085***	-0.074***	0.0078
With a tertiary education	0.158 (0.365)	0.0951 (0.293)	0.187 (0.390)	0.155 (0.362)	-0.063***	-0.092***	-0.059***
Living in an urban area	0.635 (0.481)	0.572 (0.495)	0.651 (0.477)	0.615 (0.487)	-0.063***	-0.079***	-0.042**

Source: IFLS-5, authors' calculation. Objection level if someone with a different faith from you…[1,2,3,4]

and urban, albeit less so than the Muhammadiyah followers (table 2). Meanwhile, those affiliated with other organizations are also concentrated in West Java and, interestingly, West Nusa Tenggara, and socioeconomically are the second least-advantaged group after NU.

Since information on which group belongs to this other affiliation category is not available from the IFLS, we could not clearly determine their political aspirations or relationship to NU and Muhammadiyah. Nonetheless, the information on ritual activities and religiosity in table 3 may provide some clues. Assuming a positive correlation between piety and these ritual activities, based on their self-declared frequency of daily prayers (*shalat*), religious meeting attendance (*pengajian, majlis taklim, ceramah*), and self-assessed religiosity level, those who belong to other Muslim groups appear to be the most religious, while the reference group is the least religious. Combined with information on their socioeconomic status in table 2, the reference group appears to consist of secular, affluent Muslims, living in fast-growing urban areas. The other affiliation group appears to be Muslims living in the same urban areas who are very (ritually) religious, but less affluent than the reference group and Muhammadiyah.

Regression Results

We first run logit regression of religious intolerance indicators by Muslim organization affiliation only, without any control variables of individual socioeconomic factors. In our regression specification, the reference group for comparing relative tolerance levels across organizational affiliations consists of those who are not affiliated with any Islamic organization—the least religious group as defined from religiosity indicators above.

In this simple specification, we find that NU followers are indeed less tolerant than those not affiliated with any Islamic organization (the reference group), but they are the least intolerant group among those affiliated with an Islamic organization. This is evident across all religious intolerance indicators. For example, the odds[59] of a NU follower objecting to non-Muslims living in the same village (ranging from 1 = no objection at all, 2 = no objection, 3 = objection, and 4 = strong objection) is 1.13 times greater than those in the reference group (column 1, table 4). However, for the same tolerance category, the odds for a Muhammadiyah follower are 1.18 times higher than the reference group, whereas for followers of other groups they are 1.58 times higher. The coefficients of ordinal logit regression results (the log of odds ratio) are in table 1.A in the appendix.

[59] The odds ratio is the probability of the event divided by the probability of non-event. In this case, it is the probability of having a higher level objection of the religious tolerance behaviour versus the probability of having a lower level of objection.

Table 3
Religiosity by affiliation

Affiliation	**Frequency of prayer**			
	<5 times	5 times	6-10 times	>10 times
Not affiliated with any Islamic tradition	27.08	51.94	11.48	9.5
NU	22.93	56.92	12.93	7.22
Muhammadiyah	22.76	55.44	14.78	7.03
Other	11.62	54.57	23.69	10.12
All Muslims	23.21	55.75	13.31	7.73
	Frequency of attendance at religious meetings			
	>1/ week	>1/ week	>1x/ month	<1x/ month	None
Not affiliated with any Islamic tradition	5.26	19.13	15.88	14.99	44.74
NU	6.54	25.38	21.19	15.28	31.61
Muhammadiyah	5.99	23.69	23.66	14.36	32.3
Other	13.85	27.35	21.14	11.01	26.64
All Muslims	6.53	24.12	20.52	14.95	33.87
	Self-assessed religiosity			
	Very religious	Religious	Somewhat religious	Not religious	Refused
Not affiliated with any Islamic tradition	12.68	59.48	22.94	4.5	0.39
NU	15.21	60.69	21.65	1.3	0.15
Muhammadiyah	16.53	59.25	20.52	3.57	0.12
Other	17.13	64.33	16.5	1.95	0.09
All Muslims	14.98	60.44	21.55	2.84	0.19

Source: IFLS-5, authors' calculation.

Note: [<5 times] means praying less than five a day, [5 times] five times a day, [6-10 times] around 6-10 times a day, [>10 times] more than ten times a day. [>1x/week] means attending more than once a week, [>=1x/week] at least once a week, [>=1x/ month] at least once a month, [<1x/month] s less than once a month, [None] not going to the meetings.

Table 4
Odds ratio ordinal logit model without control variables

Objection level if someone from a different faith:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Lives in the same village	Lives in the same neighbour-hood	Rents a room from you	Marries your relative	Builds a place of worship in the community
Organization (reference group = not affiliated with any Islamic tradition)					
NU	1.129*** (3.57)	1.123*** (3.35)	1.110*** (3.53)	1.175*** (5.27)	1.236*** (7.26)
Muham madiyah	1.184*** (3.42)	1.216*** (3.98)	1.168*** (3.65)	1.239*** (4.99)	1.348*** (7.14)
Other	1.581*** (6.52)	1.614*** (6.82)	1.356*** (4.96)	1.485*** (6.47)	1.591*** (7.73)
Number of observations	28,400	28,400	28,400	28,399	28,400

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Objection level [1,2,3,4].

The average marginal effects of the ordinal logit model in figure 4 provide more intuitive information. Apart from the first indicator of objection for non-Muslims living in the same village, Muhammadiyah and other groups are less tolerant than NU as the dispersion between a high likelihood of "objection" and "strong objection" and a low likelihood of "no objection" and "no objection at all" is greater for Muhammadiyah and other organizations. For example, a Muhammadiyah follower is 4.8 percentage points more likely to strongly object to non-Muslims building a house of worship in the community than the reference group, compared to 3.3 percentage points for NU followers and 7.8 percentage points for other organizations' followers. The complete average marginal effects estimates are in table 2.A in the appendix.

The results are in sharp contrast to Mietzner and Muhtadi's finding that NU followers are less tolerant than Muhammadiyah on all indicators. They

are more in line with the findings of the Asia Foundation survey in 2010, which revealed that 75 percent of Muhammadiyah respondents objected to having non-Muslim places of worship, versus 63 percent of NU respondents, and 30 percent of Muhammadiyah respondents preferred to not have non-Muslim neighbours, versus 29 percent of NU respondents.[60]

Figure 4
Average marginal effects: ordinal logit without controls



Note: Reference group is Muslims not affiliated with any Muslim organization.

Nonetheless, since proximity to certain Muslims organizations is not the only predictor for individual religious intolerance, we ran an ordinal logit regression of religious tolerance on Muslims organization affiliation and a series of other socioeconomic predictors. This is our preferred specification and our main finding remains that NU followers are generally more tolerant than Muhammadiyah, except for tolerating interfaith marriage in the family. However, the intolerance levels of other Muslim organizations' followers are generally lower, as intolerance turns out to be largely driven by socioeconomic factors rather than organizational affiliation.

Table 5 shows that, for example, the odds of a NU follower objecting to

[60] Bush, "A Snapshot."

non-Muslims living in the same neighbourhood is 1.09 times greater than those in the reference group (column 2). For a Muhammadiyah follower, the odds are 1.30 times greater, and for other organizations' followers, the odds increase by 1.15. Interestingly, the odds of an NU follower objecting to interfaith marriage in the family is 1.3 times greater than those in the reference group (column 4), which is greater than for Muhammadiyah followers. The coefficients of ordinal logit regression results (the log of odds-ratio) that use applied socioeconomic controls are in table 3.A in the appendix.

Table 5

Odds ratio ordinal logit model with socioeconomic control variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Objection level if someone from a different faith:					
	Lives in the same village	Lives in the same neighbour hood	Rents a room from you	Marries your relative	Builds a place of worship in your community
Organization (reference group = not affiliated with any Islamic tradition)					
NU	1.080* (2.14)	1.091* (2.39)	1.147*** (4.36)	1.307*** (8.23)	1.243*** (7.06)
Muhammadiyah	1.290*** (4.88)	1.304*** (5.11)	1.213*** (4.31)	1.220*** (4.45)	1.384*** (7.41)
Other	1.220** (2.68)	1.203* (2.45)	1.149* (2.13)	1.341*** (4.45)	1.262*** (3.64)
Socioeconomic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Location-specific controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	26,355	26,355	26,355	26,355	26,355

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1]. Objection level [1,2,3,4]. Socio-economic variables are income and job security, educational attainment, urban-rural location, district-level poverty and inequality, and age. Islands are Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and other islands.

The average marginal effects in figure 5 confirm the general finding that at the same income level, educational attainment, location, and demography, Muhammadiyah followers appear to be less tolerant than followers of NU and other organizations, except in interfaith marriage acceptance. Interestingly, compared to estimations without considering the differences in socioeconomic characteristics, the likelihood of other organizations' followers objecting to non-Muslims is generally lower than among Muhammadiyah followers. For example, followers of other Muslim organizations are 3.6 percentage points more likely to strongly object to non-Muslims building a house of worship in the community than those belonging to the reference group of non-affiliated Muslims, whereas Muhammadiyah and NU followers are 5.2 and 3.3 percentage points more likely to object. This dispersion reduction suggests that the high intolerance level among these followers of non-NU and Muhammadiyah organizations comes mainly from the effects of their socioeconomic background. The complete average marginal effects results from the ordinal logit regression are in table 4.A in the appendix.

Figure 5

Average marginal effects: ordinal logit with socioeconomic controls



Note: Reference group consists of Muslims not affiliated with any Muslims organization. Socioeconomic variables are income and job security, educational attainment, urban-rural location, district-level poverty and inequality, and age. Islands are Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and other islands.

Additionally, taking into account an individual's socioeconomic characteristics reduced the intolerance level of NU members in accepting non-Muslims living in the same village and neighbourhood but increased intolerance for sharing a house/room, building a house of worship in the community, and, especially, for interfaith marriage in the family. On the other hand, socioeconomic considerations increased the intolerance effects of Muhammadiyah membership in all indicators except for interfaith marriage, where the tolerance level increased (see tables 1.A and 3.A in the appendix).

The importance of socioeconomic characteristics, especially among NU members, was also presented in the Asia Foundation survey in 2010, in which almost 50 percent of NU respondents who did not accept non-Muslim house of worship building had only a primary-level school education.[61] Menchik and Trost also suggest that more educated Muslims are better at embracing tolerance.[62]

Moreover, the correlations between individual socioeconomic status and religious intolerance are generally negative, albeit less evident in more personal and contentious issues like interfaith marriage and house of worship building (see table 3.A in the appendix). To illustrate, in table 3.A, the odds of objection to non-Muslims living in the same village decreases by a factor of 1.2 for each 10 percent per capita expenditure growth. The odds also decrease by a factor of 0.63 if the Muslim attains tertiary education and by 0.16 if they live in an urban area. Nevertheless, interestingly, this is not the case for interfaith marriage, as the odds of being intolerant actually increase along with higher socioeconomic status.

Conclusion

Whether the followers of a certain Muslim organization are more intolerant than other Muslims is not as simple to measure as it seems. In this study, our aim is modest. We measure the religious intolerance levels of Indonesian Muslims based on their organizational affiliation (NU, Muhammadiyah, and other organizations) by comparing the religious intolerance of these organizations' followers, adjusted for their socioeconomic background, against the religious tolerance of the reference group: Muslims who declare themselves unaffiliated with any Indonesian Muslim organization. We find that NU followers (66 percent of Indonesian Muslims) are more tolerant than both Muhammadiyah and other organizations' followers (16 percent); and in two out of five religious tolerance indicators, they are almost as tolerant as the reference group's members.

As a caveat, this study is a descriptive analysis. Our empirical strategy does not allow for asserting that being a member of a certain organization changes an individual's religious intolerance level, or that the organization's

[61] Bush, "A Snapshot," 23.

[62] Menchik and Trost, "A Tolerant Indonesia," 390–405.

leadership policy affects members' religious intolerance levels. Neither does our study empirically test whether the organizations' leadership failed to nurture a more tolerant attitude among their followers nor why higher socioeconomic status is associated with less tolerance for interfaith marriage, especially among NU followers. We opine, however, that religious tolerance should be encouraged in a democracy and NU and Muhammadiyah could and should play a bigger role in promoting it.

Universitas Jenderal Soedirman, Indonesia
Leiden University, the Netherlands
Universitas Padjadjaran, Indonesia, August 2022

Appendix

Table 1.A.
Coefficients: Ordinal logit regression without socioeconomic controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Objection level if someone from a different faith:					
	Lives in the same village	Lives in the same neighbour-hood	Rents a room from you	Marries your relative	Builds a place of worship in your community
Organization (reference group = not affiliated to any Islamic tradition)					
NU	0.121*** (3.57)	0.116*** (3.35)	0.104*** (3.53)	0.161*** (5.27)	0.212*** (7.26)
Muhammadiyah	0.169*** (3.42)	0.195*** (3.98)	0.156*** (3.65)	0.214*** (4.99)	0.299*** (7.14)
Other	0.458*** (6.52)	0.479*** (6.82)	0.305*** (4.96)	0.395*** (6.47)	0.464*** (7.73)
Number of observations	28,400	28,400	28,400	28,399	28,400

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; objection level [1,2,3,4].

Table 2.A.
Average marginal effects (dy/dx) ordinal logit regression without socioeconomic controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Objection level if someone from a different faith:					
	Lives in the same village	Lives in the same neighbour-hood	Rents a room from you	Marries your relative	Builds a place of worship in your community
Organization (reference group = not affiliated to any Islamic tradition					
NU					
No objection at all	-0.00542*** (-3.46)	-0.00423** (-3.23)	-0.00226*** (-3.40)	-0.00144*** (-4.81)	-0.00338*** (-6.56)
No objection	-0.0161*** (-3.69)	-0.0165*** (-3.45)	-0.0238*** (-3.54)	-0.0186*** (-5.09)	-0.0475*** (-7.20)
Objection	0.0151*** (3.62)	0.0147*** (3.39)	0.0154*** (3.48)	-0.0179*** (-5.61)	0.0177*** (6.52)
Strong objection	0.00646*** (3.67)	0.00601*** (3.43)	0.0106*** (3.60)	0.0379*** (5.34)	0.0331*** (7.53)
Muham-madiyah					
No objection at all	-0.00740*** (-3.48)	-0.00687*** (-4.02)	-0.00330*** (-3.68)	-0.00186*** (-4.84)	-0.00457*** (-6.98)
No objection	-0.0230*** (-3.34)	-0.0288*** (-3.89)	-0.0356*** (-3.65)	-0.0243*** (-5.04)	-0.0663*** (-7.20)
Objection	0.0212*** (3.40)	0.0252*** (3.95)	0.0227*** (3.70)	-0.0246*** (-4.85)	0.0230*** (7.37)
Strong objection	0.00919*** (3.34)	0.0105*** (3.87)	0.0161*** (3.59)	0.0507*** (4.98)	0.0479*** (6.98)

Other organizations					
No objection at all	-0.0176*** (-7.25)	-0.0148*** (-7.53)	-0.00603*** (-5.28)	-0.00316*** (-6.52)	-0.00659*** (-8.12)
No objection	-0.0706*** (-5.81)	-0.0787*** (-6.15)	-0.0697*** (-4.98)	-0.0420*** (-6.98)	-0.101*** (-8.03)
Objection	0.0599*** (6.30)	0.0643*** (6.60)	0.0423*** (5.35)	-0.0500*** (-5.79)	0.0297*** (10.07)
Strong objection	0.0284*** (5.66)	0.0293*** (5.89)	0.0334*** (4.60)	0.0952*** (6.37)	0.0782*** (7.11)
Number of observations	28,400	28,400	28,400	28,399	28,400

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3.A.
Coefficients: Ordinal logit regression with socioeconomic controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Objection level if someone from a different faith:					
	Lives in the same village	Lives in the same neighbour-hood	Rents a room from you	Marries your relative	Builds a place of worship in your community
Organization (reference group = not affiliated to any Islamic tradition)					
NU	0.0769* (2.14)	0.0871* (2.39)	0.137*** (4.36)	0.268*** (8.23)	0.217*** (7.06)
Muhammadiyah	0.254*** (4.88)	0.266*** (5.11)	0.193*** (4.31)	0.199*** (4.45)	0.325*** (7.41)
Other	0.199** (2.68)	0.185* (2.45)	0.139* (2.13)	0.294*** (4.45)	0.233*** (3.64)
Income and job security					
Per capita expenditure (log)	-0.123*** (-5.45)	-0.119*** (-5.22)	-0.0345 (-1.76)	0.117*** (5.86)	-0.107*** (-5.58)

Table 3.A. - continued
Coefficients: Ordinal logit regression with socioeconomic controls

Secured job [1,0]	-0.188*** (-5.94)	-0.145*** (-4.51)	-0.190*** (-6.98)	-0.130*** (-4.71)	-0.122*** (-4.53)
Level of education					
Primary (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)	0.163* (2.46)	0.102 (1.52)	0.254*** (4.02)	0.390*** (6.21)	0.406*** (7.41)
Lower secondary (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)	-0.343*** (-4.67)	-0.384*** (-5.14)	0.0842 (1.24)	0.662*** (9.79)	0.394*** (6.54)
Upper secondary (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)	-0.745*** (-10.10)	-0.743*** (-9.91)	-0.0133 (-0.20)	0.858*** (12.65)	0.284*** (4.71)
Tertiary (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)	-1.007*** (-12.23)	-0.935*** (-11.10)	0.0980 (1.31)	1.346*** (17.80)	0.372*** (5.38)
Community characteristics					
Urban areas (1 = yes; 0 = rural areas)	-0.177*** (-5.74)	-0.199*** (-6.42)	0.107*** (4.04)	0.191*** (7.27)	0.0446 (1.76)
Number of poor people in the city (log)	0.0380* (2.07)	0.0139 (0.76)	0.0490** (3.19)	0.0128 (0.79)	-0.00671 (-0.42)
Inequality—Gini coefficient	-2.361*** (-7.10)	-2.672*** (-7.87)	-2.052*** (-7.09)	-0.433 (-1.48)	-2.974*** (-10.55)
Island-fixed specific effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other demography					
Age (years) and age squared	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	26,355	26,355	26,355	26,355	26,355

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; objection level [1,2,3,4]. Socioeconomic variables are income and job security, educational attainment, urban-rural location, district-level poverty and inequality, and age. Islands are Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and other islands.

Table 4.A.
Average marginal effects (dy/dx): Ordinal logit regression with socioeconomic controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Objection level if someone from a different faith:					
	Lives in the same village	Lives in the same neighbour-hood	Rents a room from you	Marries your relative	Builds a place of worship in your community
Organization (reference group = not affiliated to any Islamic tradition)					
NU					
No objection at all	-0.00330* (-2.10)	-0.00308* (-2.33)	-0.00299*** (-4.14)	-0.00246*** (-6.87)	-0.00342*** (-6.37)
No objection	-0.00971* (-2.18)	-0.0118* (-2.43)	-0.0302*** (-4.38)	-0.0303*** (-7.79)	-0.0473*** (-7.01)
Objection	0.00892* (2.15)	0.0103* (2.41)	0.0194*** (4.28)	-0.0272*** (-9.13)	0.0171*** (6.32)
Strong objection	0.00409* (2.18)	0.00452* (2.43)	0.0138*** (4.48)	0.0599*** (8.42)	0.0337*** (7.32)
Muhammadiyah					
No objection at all	-0.0101*** (-4.98)	-0.00870*** (-5.18)	-0.00408*** (-4.33)	-0.00189*** (-4.35)	-0.00486*** (-7.19)
No objection	-0.0346*** (-4.73)	-0.0384*** (-4.99)	-0.0425*** (-4.31)	-0.0231*** (-4.49)	-0.0701*** (-7.48)
Objection	0.0301*** (4.85)	0.0322*** (5.09)	0.0268*** (4.37)	-0.0193*** (-4.31)	0.0230*** (7.63)
Strong objection	0.0146*** (4.69)	0.0149*** (4.91)	0.0198*** (4.22)	0.0443*** (4.44)	0.0520*** (7.23)

Table 4.A. - continued
Average marginal effects (dy/dx): Ordinal logit regression with socioeconomic controls

Other organizations					
No objection at all	-0.00809** (-2.82)	-0.00626** (-2.58)	-0.00302* (-2.21)	-0.00267*** (-4.61)	-0.00364*** (-3.84)
No objection	-0.0265* (-2.54)	-0.0259* (-2.34)	-0.0307* (-2.13)	-0.0330*** (-4.71)	-0.0506*** (-3.68)
Objection	0.0234** (2.64)	0.0221* (2.41)	0.0196* (2.19)	-0.0303*** (-3.97)	0.0180*** (4.15)
Strong objection	0.0111* (2.53)	0.0100* (2.33)	0.0140* (2.06)	0.0660*** (4.37)	0.0363*** (3.48)
Number of observations	26,355	26,355	26,355	26,355	26,355

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; socioeconomic variables are income and job security, educational attainment, urban-rural location, district-level poverty and inequality, and age. Islands are Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and other islands.